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Abstrac#-Category 3, Class elD missions have the benefit of 
delivering worthwhile science at minimal cost wbich is 
increasingly important in NASA's constrained budget 
environment. Although higher cost Category 1 and 2 missions 
are necessary to achieve NASA's science objectives, Category 3 
missions are shown to be an effective way to provide significRnt 
science return at a low cost. Category 3 missions, however, are 
often reviewed the same as the more risk averse Category 1 
and 2 missions. Acknowledging that reviews are not the only 
aspect of a total engineering effort, reviews are still a 
significant concern for· NASA programs. This can 
unnecessarily increase the cost and schedule of Category 3 
missions. This paper quantifies the benefit and performance of 
Category ,3 missions by looking at the cost vs. capability 
relative to Category 1 and 2 missions. Lessons learned from 
successful organizations -that develop low cost Category 3, 
Class CID missions are also investigated to help provide the 
basis for suggestions to streamline the review of NASA 
Category 3 missions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Category 3 missions are the lowest cost and highest risk 
missions within NASA's science portfolio. Category 3 
missions do, however, provide significant benefit to NASA 
by providing important science contributions at a low cost. 
[I] [2] [3] The success of Category 3 missions becomes even 
more important at this time when NASA budgets are 
becoming more and more restrictive. The continued success 
of Category 3 missions will be important to NASA's future. 
NASA has developed a set of guiding documents to provide 
different requirements and governing principles for missions 
of differing levels of criticality. NASA Procedural 
Requirement (NPR) 7I20.5E defines different categories of 
missions based on their priority to NASA's strategic goals 
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and their relative total mission life cycle cost (LCC), as 
shown in Table I. [4] Similarly, NPR 8705.4 defines 
different classes of missions based upon a variety of factors, 
as shown in Table 2. [5] The definitions of mission 
categories and classes allow a distinction between missions 
in terms of guidelines for development. Although there are 
clear guidelines for elements such as parts selection and 
testing reqnirements, the review requirements for these 
missions are much more ambiguous. This ambiguity often 
leads review teams to default to the conunon practices and 
extensive requirements of larger missions. As a result, the 
lower priority, lower cost Category 3, Class CID missions 
are being reviewed similar to high priority, higher cost 
Category 112, Class AlB missions. A conunon statement in 
NASA is "Every mission is Class A by the time it 
launches". The primary benefit of Category 3 missions is 
their ability to collect science data at a relatively low cost. 
By treating Category 3 missions the same as Category I or 2 
missions, the effort reduces this benefit and provides a 
substantial burden on the Category 3 mission project team 
and reduces the benefit to NASA and its stakeholders. 
Table 1. Category 1, 2, 3 Definitions from NPR 7120.5E 
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This paper addresses the benefits of the lower cost Category 
3, Class CID missions, looks at relative failure rates of 
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similar organizations that manage and build Category 3 
missions, and provides recommendations for potentially 
streamlining the review process for Category 3 missions to 
maintain or improve quality while retaining the benefits of 
these low cost missions. 
2. BENEFTIS OF CATEGORY 3 MISSIONS 
Overview 
NASA employs a mix of missions within its portfolio to 
accomplish desired science objectives. Large Category I 
high priority flagship missions, such as the Hubble Space 
Telescope, are required to answer unique science questions 
that only a large scale telescope can address. Other 
missions, like the Cassini and Galileo Orbiters, are the most 
cost effective way to operate a large number of scientific 
instruments orbiting a distant planet. Medium sized 
Category 2 missions are also important as they can provide 
focused platforms for science that requires either multiple 
instruments for simultaneous observations or single medium 
to large sized instruments that have a unique scientific 
objective. Less costly Category 3 missions are also 
necessary, however, to conduct initial observations or fill 
gaps in knowledge for certain science disciplines. They can 
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also be significantly more focused in their science 
objectives, yielding a small, but significant scientific result. 
Data Collection and Mission Categorization 
To assess the benefit of each category of missions, data 
were collected for NASA missions launched within the last 
15 years. The intent was to do a comparison between 
Category I, 2 and 3 missions to characterize their mission 
cost, failure rate and overall benefit. The result is a set of 62 
NASA missions listed individually in the Appendix. The 
missions included in the study represent a wide range of 
category and class of missions. Figure I shows the 
distribution of the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) in FY12$ as 
compared to the category and class of the mission. All real 
year mission cost data were inflated to fiscal year 2012 
dollars (FYI2$) so as to represent, as best as possible, the 
real year dollar guidance for LCC categories as stated in 
NPR 7120.5E and shown in Table I. As can be seen, 
Category I missions consist of Class A and B missions, 
where Category 2 missions consist of a balanced mix of 
Class B and C missions while Category 3 consists of Class 
C and D missions. Category 3 missions include the lower 
cost half of the Class C missions launched within the last 15 
years. 
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Figure 1 - Life Cycle Cost Characterization of Mission Category & Class for the Study Data Set 
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One of the objectives of the paper was to identify the 
relative science costlbenefit of each mission class. As snch, 
only NASA Science Missions that meet certain criteria were 
considered. Missions that have recently been launched but 
have yet to begin their science missions, such as the 
Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) and Nuclear 
Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) missions, were 
not considered because their success has yet to be 
determined at the time of writing. Missions that relied 
heavily on international contributions, such as the Tropical 
Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) and CALIPSO 
missions, were also elimmated from consideration due to the 
difficulty of assessing foreign costs. Additionally, only full 
science missions were considered. Therefore "Instrument-
only" science experiments, where the instrument was 
provided to another organization, were not considered. 
Technology demonstrators, such as NanoSail-D and 
Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology 
(DART), were also excluded given that their primary focus 
is technology demonstration, not science. In addition, 
operational missions like the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite (GOES) series, were excluded in. 
order to focus on more typical, one of a kind NASA science 
missions. 
Cost Categorization 
The average cost for each mission category is shown in 
Figure 2. Given that one of the primary criteria for 
categorization of missions per NPR 7120.5E is cost, the 
resnlt is as expected with Category 1 missions being 
substantially higher than Category 2 missions which are 
more costly than Category 3 missions. 
Average Cost per Mission 
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Figure 2 - Average Cost (FY12$M) per Category 
Failure Rate Categorization 
The average failure rate for each mission category was also 
calculated, as shown in Figure 3 with Category 3 missions, 
being mostly comprised of Class C and D missions, 
experiencing a much higher failure rate than Category 1 or 2 
missions. A mission failure is defined as a launch vehicle or 
spacecraft failure. An interesting note, which is discussed 
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more in Section 3, is that Category 3 missions also have a 
much higher non-confirmation rate. 
Failure Rate per Category 
~% 26% 
25% HJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ~ . 
20% +----------
15% HJJJJJJJJJJJD~ohIJJ~J22%__stC 
10% ------------- 4% -----
5% 8% 
0% .jJJJiflJll.<J~~J ---.--.,----
CAT 1 CAT 2 CAT 3 
Figure 3 - Average Failure Rate per Category 
"Science Return" Categorization 
Assessing the benefit of a science mission is typically very 
subjective as the ''value'' to one scientist for any given data 
returned will not be the same as to another scientist in 
another discipline. There is no perfect way to judge 
scientific instrument value. To assess the benefit for the 
purposes of the study, two "science return" metries were 
investigated to provide an objective measure ofbenefi!. The 
first "science return" metric calculates the number of 
instruments operating over their lifetime and was originally 
proposed as an objective quantification of overall science 
value. [6] In addition, a second metric was defined to look 
at the total data retorned from all science instruments over 
the lifetime of the mission. Other metrics were considered 
but found to have certain issues that were hard to overcome. 
For example, the number of papers published by mission 
scientists was considered but was believed to 
disproportionately favor large, prolific tearns that publish 
mnltiple papers versus a small team that publish a few, very 
significant papers. Similarly, a metric based on the number 
of "significant" findings that resulted from the mission 
wonld be challenging to use given that the term 
"significant" is very subjective and difficnlt to quantify. It 
has also been suggested that the science value of an 
instrument is proportional to its mass. This metric suggests, 
however, that planetary missions are inherently less 
valuable than Earth orbiting missions because planetary 
missions typically have much less payload mass due to the 
difficulty of getting its payload to its final destination. 
Combined, the two proposed metrics should provide a 
reasonable assessment of the benefit of the different classes. 
The first proposed metric uses the number of instruments 
on-board the satellite multiplied by the length of time the 
instruments take data at their final destination and is 
measured in terms of "instrument-months." [6] 
Multiplying by the duration that the instrument operates 
provides a surrogate for the quantity and depth of 
information gathered by the instrument. The proposed 
metric also accounts for full and partial mission failures 
because the failed mission's instrument duration of 
operation, and corresponding science return, would be zero. 
When this metric is applied to the dataset used for this 
study, the results are as expected, with Category I missions 
returning more science than Category 2 missions which 
return more valne than Category 3 missions, the results of 
which are shown in Figure 4. 
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Fignre 4 - Average Instrnment Month per Mission 
The second metric closely parallels the instrument-months 
metric but utilizes the instrument data rate and operating 
durations to calculate the data returned from the mission 
data set. When this metric is applied, the results are also as 
expected, with Category I missions returning more data 
than Category 2 missions which return significantly more 
data than Category 3 missions, the results of which are 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 - Average Data Rate per Mission 
"Science Return" Metrics Caveats & Limitations 
These metrics provide a different perspective of value for 
each mission class bnt each has its limitations. A primary 
assumption of the first metric is that all instruments provide 
equal science valne. The basic mtionale for this assumption 
is that each instrument is placed on-board a satellite to 
achieve a specific scientific objective and that all scientific 
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objectives are considered of equal value. The obvious 
limitation of such a metric is that all instruments are not 
created equal. The metric itself treats each instrument the 
same even though a very sophisticated imaging mdar 
instrument is much more complex to develop than a simple 
magnetometer. It could be argned, however, that the value 
to the scientist utilizing the magnetometer data is the same 
as the scientist utilizing the data from a radar image as each 
is answering a relevant science qnestion with the data 
obtained. 
The primary assumption of the second metric is that every 
data bit genemted by a science mission is of the same value 
as any other bit from another mission. This a limiting 
assumption, however, as an instrument that collects 
significant amounts of data, such as a Synthetic Aperture 
Radar (SAR), would be deemed inherently more valuable 
than instruments that collect less data. 
The value of each instrument that NASA launches carmot be 
understated. NASA employs a severely competitive science 
selection process using a peer review board of scientists to 
select the most valuable science from all proposals 
submitted. Table 3 identifies that, over the last 15 years of 
Small Explorer (SMEX) and the no longer existing 
University Explorer (UNEX) proposals submitted, ouly the 
top 6% were selected for implementation. Given the 
number of proposals submitted and the thoroughness of the 
evaluation process, it is believed that the science of these 
missions . is of the best that can fit within the cost 
constraints. Additionally, given that mass, power and 
volume resources on a spacecmft are always tight and 
extremely valuable; each instrument has to "buy" its way 
onto the spacecmfl such that the selection of each is 
warranted. For those missions that can be implemented 
within Category 3 funding constraints, the competitive 
process achieves high value science with the selected 
missions and instruments. 
Table 3. NASA SMEXIUNEX Program Selections 
"Science Value" Cost Effectiveness Metrics 
The results shown in Fignres 2 through 5 are as expected; 
although Category I and 2 missions are more expensive 
than Category 3 missions, they also fail less often and 
provide more science return per mission. This is a 
straightforward outcome given that Category 3 missions are 
made up of less reliable Class C and Class D missions while 
the reduced scope reqnired to meet funding gnidelines limit 
the number of instruments and years of operations thereby 
reducing the science return, as indicated by the instrument-
months and data returned metric. 
Given that Category 3 missions are shown to provide such 
little science return and fail more often, why should 
Category 3 missions be attempted at all? The answer lies as 
being cost effective building blocks for future discoveries. 
Given that science return has been defined with instrument-
months or as data returned, it is a simple task to divide the 
two proposed metrics by the total mission LCC to determine 
the cost-effectiveness of each mission. When viewed this 
way, these cost-effectiveness metries measure the mission's 
"bang for the buck" or the amount of science gathered per 
dollar. This cost-effectiveness approach can be extended to 
each mission class by summing the total instrument-moths 
or data returned for missions in a given class and dividing 
by the total LCC of the mission. in that class. Computing 
these values, the data presented indicates that Category 3 
missions are either the most cost effective category,as 
shown in Figure 6 relative to instrument montha per dollar, 
or essentially equally as cost-effective, as shown in Figure 7 
based on the data returned per dollar. 
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As stated previously, there are certain scientific objectives 
that cannot be accomplished given the funding and 
subsequent size and complexity constraints of a Category 3 
5 
nnsslOn. For those scientific objectives that can be 
implemented within the constraints of a Category 3 mission, 
however, the two metrics - developed indicate that the 
mission implementations seem to provide a fairly cost 
effective acquisition strategy. . The data indicates that 
Category 3 missions can. serve as a cost-effective, critical 
building block for a balanced portfolio of missions. 
3. FAILURE RESULTS SUMMARY 
As shown previously in Section 2.4, satellite failures have 
occurred more often in Category 3 missions than in 
Category I and 2 missions. As shown in Table 4, the 
majority of these failures have been in the satellite flight 
system. In addition, Category 3 missions have a greater 
probability of being non-confirmed. Of the eight missions 
that were cancelled or not confirmed from 1997 to 20 II, 
five of those missions were Category 3 missions. Given the 
23 Category 3 missions launched, the five missions 
represent an 18% cancellation rate (i.e., 5 out of 28 total 
missions) which is siguificant. Combined with the failure 
statistics, this represents a probability of cancellation or 
failure for missions that are selected on the order of 39%. A 
further breakdown of the missions that have failed and the 
possible cause of failure or cancellation/non-confirmation 
are provided in Table 5. More detail on each mission is 
contained in the Appendix. 
Table 4. Canses of Mission Failnre 
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4. NASA REvIEW PROCESS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STREAMLINING 
Overview 
NPR 8705.4 provides guidance for the distinction of Class 
A, B, C and D missions for a variety of different elements. 
As a previously described, Category 3 missions are usually 
covered by Class C & D guidance. Although NPR 8705.5 
provides good guidance on many aspects of mission 
development, such as testing, parts/materials, safety, 
reliability, risk management, etc., relative to Class A, B, C 
and D missions, there is very little guidance relative to the 
implementation of reviews. As shown in Figure 8, guidance 
for reviews is provided in One line. Although this line 
provides general guidance for overall reviews, it does not 
address specific requirements for reviews at a lower level. 
NPR 7120.5E also provides some guidance relative to 
Category 1,2 and 3 mission, as shown in Figure 9 and states 
that NASA Centers have the sole Techuical Authority for 
Category 3 missions. Given that is the case, Center 
I Class B 
1-
Development Class A 
TOI'",ic'---1 
Directors can work with the Mission Directorate Associate 
Admiuistrator (MDAA) to identify an acceptable review 
approach. Although Category 3 reviews are governed by 
NASA Centers, current policy does not provide good, 
uuiversal guidance on the streamliuing of reviews for 
Category 3 missions. [26] 
An example of the growing review requirements for 
Category 3 missions can be seen by the experience of the 
Small Explorer (SMEX) Aeronomy of Ice in the 
Mesosphere (AIM) mission. Iuitially the AIM team, as part 
of their proposal and Concept Study Report for the 
competed SMEX mission, proposed ten reviews for the 
major milestones. Due to circumstances originating over 
the initial concern about the cost of the mission and 
spacecraft, the AIM project was required by the Independent 
Integrated Review Team (IIRT) to hold over fifty reviews 
prior to mission CDR. As shown in Figure 10, the 3 
original reviews that were to encompass Systems 
Requirement Review (SRR), Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR) and the Confirmation Readiness Review activities 
expanded to include 29 reviews during that timeframe. [27] 
Although it is difficult to quantify the complete cost impact 
of such an increased review requirement, at minimum there 
was a siguificant disruption of project activities and 
progress. 
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Fignre 8 - Review Requirements for Class A, B, C, D Missions as Stated in NPR 8705.4 
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Figure 9 - Convening Authorities for Standing Review Boards as Stated in NPR 7120.5E 
6 
IIRT Plan 4/1/03 
• 3 planned reviews grew to 29 
• 50+ Reviews from 5103 SRR to 
11104 MCDR Including 3 SRRs 
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Figure 10 - Expansion of Review Experienced by AIM as Presented by tbe AIM Principal Investigator [27] 
Although the NASA AIM Project Manager also commented 
on the escalation of reviews that AIM experienced, he also 
stated the benefit of internal peer reviews in the following 
statements: "One type of review - peer reviews - were of 
significant value, particularly in the early phases of the 
project when technical input and critique were incorporated 
for a modest investment in time. Some of the most effective 
peer reviews were small and informal with a modest number 
of expert participants. On more than one occasion, however, 
the peer reviews were preceded by a dry run peer review to 
enable the desigu team to work issues. As these reviews 
become more broadly attended with increased formality, 
they lose the original intent. One wonders how this trend to 
formality might be reversed." [28] 
Considerations for Streamlining 
To more fully understand the possibility of streamlining 
reviews, the pmctice of two United States Air Force (USAF) 
organizations were investigated. Although these 
organizations launch a variety of different types of ntissions, 
both launch a subset of missions that are equivalent in scope 
to NASA Category 3 ntissions and, for this subset, they 
expetience a relatively high mission success mte. It must be 
noted, however, that the missions developed by these 
organizations are primarily short term technology 
demonstration missions and, therefore, have different 
overall objectives than NASA science missions. There 
should be some consideration given that technology 
demonstrations missions may be able to allow for some 
liberties that a NASA Science ntission may not be able to 
take. Given their relatively high success mte, however, an 
assessment of review practices of these organizations was 
conducted. 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) Space Test Progmm 
(STP) is chartered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
to serve as " ... the primary provider of mission design, 
spacecraft acquisition, integration, launch, and on-orbit 
operations for DOD's most innovative space experiments, 
technologies and demonstrations". [29] The Space Test 
Progmm has been providing access to space for the DOD 
space research and development community since 1965. 
The Space Test Program has a long history and well-
developed expertise in mission design, spacecraft bus 
acquisition, payload integration and testing, and launch and 
on-orbit operations. 
The Air Force Research Labomtory's Space Vehicles 
(AFRURV) Directomte leads the nation in space supremacy 
research and development. Their mission is to develop and 
transition innovative high-payoff space technologies 
supporting the warfighter, while leveraging commercial, 
civil and other government space capabilities to ensure 
America's advantage. [30] 
Figure II shows the failure mte of the STP and AFRL 
organizations as compared to the failure mte of NASA 
Category 3 missions. As can be seen, the combined failure 
rate of STP and AFRL missions is significantly lower than 
for NASA missions. In the same time petiod from 1997 to 
20 II, STP and AFRL have launched fourteen missions that 
are relatively equivalent to NASA Category 3 missions. Of 
those 14 missions, ouly one expetienced a spacecraft failure 
and ouly one experienced a launch vehicle failure for an 
ovemll failure rate of 14% as compared to the one launch 
vehicle and five spacecraft failures of the 23 NASA 
Category 3 missions launched in that same time petiod. 
Based on the relative success of their missions, Aerospace 
personnel supporting these organizations were asked to 
provide comments on their review process in order to 
identify differences STP's and AFRL's review approach 
relative to NASA. 
Failure Rate Comparison 
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Figure 11 - Failure Rate for Equivalent Category 3 
Missions 
STP and AFRL Experiences [31 ] 
When discussing· the STP and AFRL review processes, it 
was clear that the reviews by themselves were not the 
primary contributing factor to the success of their missions. 
.Both STP and AFRL have a unique, streamlined mission 
assurance approach that relies on identifying high risk 
elements early and then focusing on these risk areas with 
greater scrutiny while minimizing review of the lower or 
accepted risk items. Both STP and AFRL rely on the 
contractor's normal best practices while focusing on the 
high risk areas throughout the project while utilizing the 
major reviews as a discriminating gate for passage to the 
next phase. Although both STP and AFRL start with 
standard entry and exit criteria for major reviews, they 
streamline these criteria tailored to each mission based on 
the initial and continuing risk assessment. This provides for 
an environment where the limited review resources are 
focused on the items that matter the most. 
STP normally conducts the following formal reviews for 
each spacecraft it acquires: System Requirements Review 
(SRR), Independent Baseline Review (ffiR), Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), 
Integration Readiness Review (IRR), Test Readiness 
Review (TRR), Space Flight Worthiness Certification (as 
part of the MRR), Pre-Ship Review (PSR), Mission 
Readiness Review (MRR), Flight Readiness Review (FRR), 
and Normal Operations Readiness Review (NORR). The 
PDR and CDR are usually about three days in length. Other 
reviews are several hours to one day in length. Reviews are 
normally chaired by the Program Manager, except for the 
MRR and NORR which is chaired by the Space 
Division/Space Test Program (SD/STP) Director, and the 
FRR which is chaired by Space and Missile Systems Center 
Commander (SMC/CC). 
The Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) applies a process to 
tailor design review criteria for STP missions. All missions, 
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Class A through D, start with the design review criteria 
outlined in the Aerospace Space Vehicle Systems 
Engineeting Handbook. Aerospace then sends out a tailored 
version of the design review criteria with the tailoring based 
on how much funding has invested in the project. In some 
cases the criteria may be significantly tailored by taking a 
quick look of each of the major subsystems so that there is a 
level of confidence that the supplying organization is 
following good practices After approval by STP, the list is 
sent to the contractor for acknowledgement that these areas 
will or will not be addressed in the review. At this point, the 
contractor is provided the opportunity to negotiate scope. 
Once the criteria are decided upon, Aerospace attends the 
review and provides verbal comments and action items. STP 
has approval authority at major milestones and utilizes the 
verbal comments and action items as input. If the project 
does not pass the Design Review then STP requires that 
either all of the liens be properly closed or requires a Delta 
Design Review in order to enter the next phase. 
STP also relies on many information reviews conducted by 
the contractor as part of their normal practices. Technical 
Issue Reviews (TIRs) are informal. Peer Reviews of 
subassemblies are occasionally conducted and led by the 
contractors during development of the subsystems and 
software systems. 
An Independent Readiness Review Team (IRRT), 
comprised of from 4-6 independent (of the program being 
evaluated) reviewers and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as 
needed, is organized by SMC. The IRRT is usually 
comprised of personnel from several organizations. 
Similarly, AFRL routinely only conducts the following 
reviews: SRR, PDR, CDR, PSR, MRR and participates in 
the SMC/CC FRR. In the past few years AFRL has also 
begun conducting an Operations Readiness Review (ORR) 
before the MRR. This focuses almost exclusively on the 
operations strategy, on-orbit and operations risks, and 
operations personnel readiness. The SRR, PDR, and CDR 
are usnally 2 days in length and are chaired by the Program 
Manager with AFRIJRV leadership in attendance as 
spectators. The MRR is specifically chaired by the 
AFRIJRV Director. 
In addition, AFRL routinely conducts an Independent 
Readiness Review (IRR), comprised of 4-6 independent (of 
the program being evaluated) reviewers plus subject matter 
experts (SMEs) as needed and as directed by the AFRLIR V 
Director. The IRR is usually supported by The Aerospace 
Corporation, with SMEs usually drawn from The Aerospace 
Corporation's engineering group. 
Peer Reviews are routinely and frequently conducted by the 
contractors during development of the subsystems and 
software systems. Occasionally InternaI Design Reviews 
(!DRs) are conducted at the contractors; but such reviews 
are rare. 
AFRL mmmnzes their documentation and distracting 
reviews. The ones condncted have over the years proven 
their worth. They have occasionally tried to do others; but 
the value never justifies the expense. 
In terms of documentation, AFRL again produces 
documentation that has been proven by AFRL to be of 
value. They produce SRR, PDR, CDR and PSR briefing 
slides but no other accompanying documentation. There is 
one exception: the System Requirements that are given to 
the contractor(s) are formally and contractually documented. 
There are no system specifications beyond what the 
contractor(s) consider in their contracts to be "normal, best 
practices" for them. The Government produces no such 
documents on AFRL projects. At the system-level, test 
planning is formalized but documentation is in Engineering 
Notebooks. Test procedures and results are published in 
formal, policy-compliant, short reports. A caution is that 
this "minimal documentation" can sometimes lead to an 
under-delivery of material .that aids in the transitioning of 
technologies, which can be a hindrance to technology 
adoption. Design specifications (especially "as built" specs) 
and test reports that focus on what has been learned about 
the various technologies are distinctly lacking. However, it 
is the culture of AFRL to proceed cautiously in terms of 
adding tasks, reviews, or documentation without careful and 
controlled proof that the benefits outweigh (usually AFRL 
seeks "far outweighs" rather than just "outweighs") the 
costs (in dollars, time, and skills). 
An additional, unique difference for AFRL missions 
includes the requirements development process. Virtually 
all requirements at AFRL are mutable; they are not "written 
in stone." The only requirements at AFRL that are typically 
"written in stone" are the Mission-level experiment 
requirements. These are the highest level of requirements 
and are established at the beginning of the project when it is 
formed. All lower-level requirements are mutable and 
"negotiable" throughout the programs to balance cost, 
schedule and technical performance. AFRL works hard to 
ensure that requirements do not ever force them into 
compromised schedules or costs. 
Recommendations 
Mission Assurance is a combination of many processes and 
factors of which the reviews and review process is a limited 
part. The 2010-2011 Mission Assurance Improvement 
Workshop (MAlW) program addressed this issue in more 
detail in developing the ''Mission Assurance Guidelines for 
A-D Mission. Risk Classes" which is based on 
recommendations from a team comprised of government 
and industry team partuers and interviews with different 
supporting organizations such as STP and AFRL. The goal 
of the team was to develop guidelines to define 
characteristic profIles for mission assurance processes for a 
given space vehicle risk Class (A, B, C, or D) to serve as a 
recommended technical baseline suitable to meet program 
needs based on programmatic constraints and mission 
needs. Appendix B2 of the MAlW document specifically 
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relates to the review process as recommended for Class C 
and D missions - i.e., Category 3 missions - to ensure that 
the review process is commensurate with the level of 
accepted mission risk. [32] The following is a sununary of 
the recommendations made by the MAIW relative to review 
requirements for Class C and D missions. 
Class C RevieWs Guideline-Risk-accepting Class C 
program reviews may not include the full suite of reviews. 
Early in the project-defiuition phase less critical reviews 
may be eliminated to balance cost containment against the 
risk of late issue identification. Planned reviews are 
typically documented in the project plan. Key reviews such 
as SRR, CDR, and MRR are generally held in compliance 
with contractor or industry standards. Review material 
generally follows standards for such reviews with some 
modification allowed to manage review cost. Items 
eliminated are perceived low risk to the project. 
Class D Review Guidelines-High-risk tolerant projects 
typically hold only at a few key milestone reviews during 
their lifecycle. Key milestones include requirements 
definition, design determination, prefabrication, and post 
hardware fabrication prior to transfer to the customer. 
These reviews typically include a few key internal to the 
contractor with contractor personnel who have similar 
project experience. External customers may be invited but 
are not required to participate. Review material is less 
formal in content and is often less than fully compliant with 
industry standards for such reviews. Early planuing for all 
projects, including Class D projects, should include a 
discussion regarding the reviews to be held during the 
project's lifecycle. 
A primary lesson learned is that, prior to any review, it is 
beneficial for a project to perform an internal readiness 
review to verify that they are ready to start and complete the 
review at hand. In addition, prior to conducting an 
independent review, the development of all entrance and 
exit criteria for each review to determine Mission Class A-D 
specific entrance and exit criteria· would be useful to set the 
expectations for that specific review. Also, required 
program Independent Reviews should be defined in the 
Project Management Plan· during project kick-off. Lastly 
Independent Review (IR) criteria should be defined early on 
to understand in the context of contractor policies. 
All reviews are given the following consideration: 
1. Requirement: 
Required, Recommended, Discretionary 
2. Independence: 
External, Internal, Developer 
3. Completeness (see following paragraphs) 
Review Completeness Guidelines for Class C Missions-
Only core mission assurance topics described in the exit 
criteria will be reviewed. The Independent Review Team 
(IRT) works with program management to determine and 
review the high and medium-high risk/mission critical areas. 
Interviews conducted with key players in the high and 
medium risk/mission critical areas. Class C requires the 
program to prove completion by review of examples, 100% 
physical review is not required. Tailoring of Independent 
Review (IR) criteria is permitted to allow review of 
summary analysis of evidence is acceptable through 
agreement between the IR T leadership and the program 
office. IRs are typically performed on an ad hoc basis. 
Review Completeness Guidelines for Class D Missions-
Reviews performed only on core mission assurance required 
by launch safety or potentially impacting any higher-class 
payload (if rideshare configuration) described in the exit 
criteria. The IRT will work with project management to 
determine and review the high risk/mission critical areas. 
Interviews should be conducted on a subset of the key 
players only in the high risk/mission critical areas. Work is 
performed through a scaled down checklist pre-defined by 
agreement between the IRT leadership and the project. 
Class D uses word of mouth or sampling as sufficient 
evidence, not necessarily requiring physical review of 
objective evidence. Siguificant tailoring of IR criteria is 
acceptable through agreement between the IRT leadership 
and the project which may not include SMEs from all 
techuical disciplines (focus is on' critical requirements of the 
mission). The IR is mostly considered an ad hoc function. 
IR requirements are stated as Required, Recommended or 
Discretionary. Required reviews are formally part of the 
project per contract requirement following an 
intemaVexternal standard. Recommended reviews are 
highly suggested following an internaVexternal standard that 
can be tailored from the suggested levels of independence 
and completeness. Discretionary reviews will be at the 
discretion of the project, contractor and/or customer 
following a defined process, which, at a miuimum, should 
include the independence and completeness levels as 
indicated in the matrix. 
The levels of independence are stated as Externally 
Independent, Internally Independent and Developer 
Independent. Externally Independent reviewers are 
orgauizations or' personnel that are techuically, 
managerially, and financially independent of the contractor. 
Internally Independent reviewers are orgauizations or 
personnel that are within the contracting orgauization - i.e., 
NASA Center - that are techuically, managerially, and 
financially independent of the project. Developer 
Independent reviewers are organizations or personnel that 
are within the contractors that are technically independent of 
the review subject developer team. 
A summary of the recommended reviews for Class C and D 
missions is shown in Table 6. For Class C missions, CDR 
and MRR are the only reviews that are proposed to be 
required, while SRR/SDRlMDR, PDR, PSR and FRR are 
recommended with SIR and PER 'being discretionary. For 
Class D missions, given the high level of risk accepted and 
the miuimal consequence for failure, no· system-level 
reviews are proposed to be required with only CDR, PSR 
and MRR being recommended. All other reviews for Class 
D missions are considered discretionary. [32] Based on the 
MAIW recommendations presented in Table 6, one 
interesting consideration is that the project's baseline 
confirmation review may need to be postponed until after 
CDR given that CDR is required for Class C missions, with 
PDR only recommended, whereas PDR is listed as fully 
discretionary for Class D missions. This would be in direct 
conflict with NPR 7120.5E, however, and would have to be 
given siguificant further thought. 
Table 6. Recommended Review Process Streamlining for Class C and D Missions 
Developer Discretionary Developer 
Internally Recommended Internally 
Discretionary Developer Discretionary Developer 
Discretionary Developer Discretionary Developer 
5. SUMMARY 
The study provides an assessment of NASA's Category 3 
missions relative to Category 1 and 2 missions over the last 
15 years. The data collected indicates that, although 
Category 3 missions cost less than Category 1 and 2 
missions, they deliver less science and fail more often. 
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Recommended Internally 
Recommended Internally 
When looked at as a whole, however, Category 3 missions 
provide a cost effective acquisition approach for missions 
that can fit within the defined c.ost constraints. Simply 
stated, Category 3 missions are not effective for delivering 
much of NASA's mission portfolio but, when used in 
appropriate situations, they can be a very cost-effective tool 
to achieve specific science. In an effort to fully realize the 
benefits to a mission portfolio that includes Category 3 
missions, it is recommended to leverage the review practices 
of the DOD STP and AFRL missions and recommendations 
made by the MAIW in an effort to potentially streamline the 
review process for Category 3 missions. As a next step, 
focused, streamlined mission assurance practices should 
also be investigated for Category 3 missions to potentially 
decrease the overall failure rate. This will also have a 
secondary, but important result of controlling cost and 
schedule increases. While this is a first step in the analysis, 
the continued success of NASA Category 3 missions is 
important for NASA's cost-constrained future. 
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APPENDIXC 
FAILURE RATE CASE STUDIES 
The following includes a short summary of failed and 
cancelledlnon-confirmed missions that is largely taken from 
[6] but has been updated with additional cases. The original 
references are included for the reader to do further research 
into the causes. 
Case Studies for Spacecraft Failures 
Lewis was launched on August 23, 1997 and re-entered the 
atmosphere on September 28 due to catastrophic failure. 
The goal of Lewis, to demonstrate advanced science 
instruments and new technologies for measuring changes in 
topography, was never reached as the spacecraft entered a 
flat spin in orbit resulting in loss of power to the solar arrays 
and eventual battery power discharge. Ground controllers 
lost contact on August 26. The attitude control system 
design had been adapted from a system used on the Total 
Ozone Mapping SpectrometerlEarth Probe (TOMSIEP) 
spacecraft. Investigation into the attitude control system 
found that insufficient analysis had been done to adapt 1;his 
design to a different spacecraft spin-axis orientation. [7][8] 
Lack of knowledge about the behavior of the spacecraft in 
orbit resulted in rotational perturbations, which eventually 
led to an uncontrolled spin. Lewis was a Category 3 
mission. 
WIRE, the Wide-Field Infrared Explorer, launched on 
March 4, 1999 suffered catastrophic failure due to design 
error and analysis. Known characteristics about a 
component in the instrument electronic box were not 
considered in depth, leading to an electrical power surge 
reaching the explosive devices at startup. [9] The activation 
of the pyrotechnics resulted in premature ejection of the 
telescope's cover resulting in exposure of the frozen 
hydrogen (used as a coolant) and the telescopes infrared 
detectors to the sun. As the telescope heated, the hydrogen 
converted to gas and expelled entirely within a period of 48 
hours from launch. Without the necessary cooling, the 
scientific mission was considered a loss. WIRE was a 
Category 3 mission. 
TERRIERS, the Tomographic Experiment using Radiative 
Recombinative Ionospheric EUY and Radio Sources 
satellite, bnilt under the NASA Student Explorer 
Demonstration Initiative (STEDI), launched on May 18, 
1999. An orientation problem with the spacecraft to allow 
the solar arrays full exposure to the Sun resulted in battery 
discharge. [10] The orientation error could be attributed to 
possible errors in the attitude control system software. 
TERRIERS was a Category 3 mission. 
MCO, the Mars Climate Orbiter bnilt by Lockheed Martin 
under the IPL Mars Surveyor '98 contract, was designed to 
serve as a communication relay for Mars Polar Lander and 
monitor weather around Mars. Launched on December II, 
1998, MCO was lost during the Mars Orbit Insertion phase. 
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The root cause of failure of the MCO nusslon was 
determined to be due to the use of English units rather than 
metric units in a ground software file. [11] The software 
file was used for trajectory modeling. This software design 
error coupled with over compensation of angular 
momentum desaturation during mission operations resulted 
in MCO' s altitude at Mars insertion being 170 km lower 
than planned. [11] The investigation board concluded that 
either MCO was destroyed upon entering Mars' atmosphere 
or re-entered space leaving Mars' atmosphere. . Software 
design error and lack of appropriate levels of program 
management / system engineering processes were also cited 
as contributing causes to the MCO failure. MCO's cost 
constraints and place it within the Category 3 mission 
classification. 
MPL, the Mars Polar Lander, designed to study volatiles 
.and climate history, was also built by Lockheed Martin 
under the IPL Mars Surveyor '98 contract. MPL was 
launched on January 3, 1999, and the anticipated 
communication between MPL and Earth during touchdown 
never occurred. This loss of communication initiated a 
recovery effort to try and communicate with MPL, with no 
success. Due to the lack of flight data available, the most 
probable cause as to the loss of MPL was determined to be 
due to the an early shutdown of MPL's descent engines 
during the touchdown phase. [12] The possible destruction 
of MPL was traced back to a software design error in the 
landing sensors. Lean program management and lack of 
key system engineering processes, in addition to a severely 
cost-constrained program exacerbated the situation leading 
up to the loss of MPL. MPL's cost, which due to lander 
development was higher than for MCO, would have placed 
the mission in Category 2. 
CONTOUR, the Comet Nucleus Tour, launched on July 3, 
2002 with the intended purpose of visiting multiple comets 
to perform a variety of investigations on the comet material. 
The spacecraft remained in Earth orbit until August 15, 
2002, when a solid rocket motor was fired to place the 
spacecraft on the trajectory to the first target. 
Communications were not possible during the firing and the 
operations team expected to regain contact with the 
spacecraft approximately 45 minutes after firing. Contact 
was never made. After numerous contact attempts with no 
success, the mission was declared lost on December 20, 
2002. While a number of reasons for the loss of the mission 
could not be completely ruled out, the probable cause was 
found to be overheating of the spacecraft from the solid 
rocket motor exhaust plume. The solid rocket motor was 
embedded within the structure of the spacecraft, as opposed 
to the typical external mounting, and the . effect of the 
heating on the whole of the spacecraft from the exhaust 
plume was not correctly analyzed. It is possible that the 
heating led to catastrophic degradation of the structural 
integrity of the spacecraft. [I3] The low cost 
implementation of CONTOUR designates the mission as 
Category 3. 
Case Studies for Cancelled Missions 
The Clark spacecraft never made it to launch due to 
cancellation of the program in February 199K The primary 
goal of Clark was to produce black and white stereo images 
with resolution up to 3 m. Primary reasons for cancellatiou 
of the program can be attributed to a combination of 
concerns about cost overruns, payload health, and an 
uncertain launch schedule. Projection of cost to complete 
the mission showed a cost overrun of 15 percent. NASA 
had spent $55 million for the budgeted $49 million mission. 
[14] The instrument to be used on Clark had been sitting on 
the ground longer than had been expected, leading to 
reservations about its operation and health while in orbit. 
Lastly, scheduling conflicts with the Lockheed Martin 
Athena program resulted in further postponement of the 
mission. Many of the concerns leading to the cancellation of 
the Clark mission related to top-level requirements for the 
mission. Clark would have been a Category 3 mission. 
ST -4, the Champollion/Comet Lander Space Technology-4 
mission, was selected as a New Millennium Program 
(NMP) mission in 1998. ST-4 was planned to travel to, land 
on, and study comet 46PfTempei I and (potentially) return a 
sample to Earth. [15] The mission was not approved to 
proceed to development in 1999 due to budgetary 
constraints caused by overruns in other mission. [16] ST-4, 
due to its expense, would have been a Category 2 mission. 
VCL, the Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) mission was 
selected in March 1997 as one of the first two Earth System 
Science Pathfmder (ESSP) missions. VCL was designed to 
utilize a multi laser Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) 
instrument to globally map the three- dimensional structure 
of the Earth's vegetation. Due to significant developmental 
difficulties with the instrument leading to projected cost 
growth, NASA decided to discontinue funding VCL in 
FY2001. [17] VCL would have been a Category 3 mission. 
IMEX, the Inner Magnetosphere Explorer (IMEX) mission 
was selected in September 1998 as one of the first set of 
UNEX missions. IMEX was to have studied the response of 
Earth's Van Allen radiation belts to variations in the solar 
wind. In September 1998 IMEX entered Phase A, which 
was continued throughout FY99 due to launch vehicle 
unavailability. IMEX was to have entered Phase B in FY 
2001 but, in January 2001, the project was not confirmed for 
preliminary design due to cost growth. [18] IMEX would 
have been a Category 3 mission. 
FAME, the Full Sky Astrometric Mapping Explorer 
mission, was selected as a Medium Explorer (MIDEX) 
mission in October 1999. FAME was planned as an 
astrometric satellite designed to determine, with 
unprecedented accuracy, the positions, distances, and 
motions of 40 million stars within our galactic 
neighborhood. FAME was designed to measure stellar 
positions to less than 50 microarcsecouds. The mission was 
not approved to proceed to development in early FY 2002, 
due to unacceptable cost growth, primarily in the 
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instrument, as identified at the Confirmation Review. [19] 
FAME, being a MIDEX mission, would have been a 
Category 2 mission. 
SPIDR, the Spectroscopy and Photometry of the IGMs 
Diffuse Radiation (SPIDR) mission was a SMEX mission 
selected in July 2002. SPIDR was designed to map 
concentrations of extremely hot gas located in filaments 
between galaxies; astronomers hypothesize that this gas may 
constitute some of the dark matter thought to exist in the 
nniverse. NASA cancelled the mission after determining 
that the mission's main instrument would not be as sensitive 
as advertised. [20] SPIDR would have been a Category 3 
mission. 
CATSAT, the Co-operative Astrophysics and Technology 
Satellite, was selected under the STEDI program to 
investigate the distance and polarization of ganuna bursts. 
The University of New Hampsbire sate.llite was scheduled 
to launch in 2002 but the project was cancelled due to cost 
escalation. [21] CATSAT would have been a Category 3 
mission. 
SIM, the Space Interferometry Mission, was a nusslOn 
initially recommended by the 1991 Astronomy and 
Astrophysics Survey Committee as the Astrometric 
Interferometry Mission. SIM was to implement 
breakthroughs in precision control technology to measure 
the positions and distances of stars with unprecedented 
precision which could determine which small, rocky planets 
are in the habitable zones. Although development started in 
October 1998, there were substantial technology 
development hurdles to overcome. Although SIM met the 
majority of ground technology demonstrations, the mission 
was not approved to proceed to implementation in 2008 due 
to budgetary constraints with the Astrophysics budget 
allocation. [22] SIM, due to its expense and importance, 
would have been a Category I mission. 
Case Studies for Launch Vehicle Failures 
QnikTOMS, the Quick Total Ozone Mapping 
Spectrometer, launched on September 21, 2001 on a Taurus 
was to· monitor ozone in the Earth's atmosphere. The 
launch vehicle briefly went out of control soon after the 
second stage ignited. Though the launch vehicle got back 
on course and deployed the spacecraft, the loss of the 
momentum during the boost phase meant that the spacecraft 
did not reach the correct altitude and velocity to stay in 
Earth orbit. The spacecraft fell back to Earth over the 
Indian Ocean. The loss of control was traced to the thrust 
vector control actuator on the second stage which did not 
move as designed when the stage ignited. [23] QnikTOMS 
was a Category 3 mission. 
OCO, the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, launched on 
February 24, 2009 on a Taurus XL launch vehicle to make 
measurements to increase the understanding of carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the Earth's atmosphere. The 
mission was lost when the launch vehicle payload fairing 
failed to separate. The spacecraft separated from the third 
stage, but was still contained with the payload fairing. Due 
to the excess mass of the payload fairing, the spacecraft did 
not attain the correct altitude or velocity to remain in Earth 
orbit and fell back to Earth over the Pacific Ocean. The 
failure of the payload fairing to separate was traced to the 
design/operation of the separation system, though a specific 
failure mechanism could not be identified. [24] OCO was a 
Category 3 mission. 
Glory launched on March 4, 2011 on a Taurus XL launch 
vehicle to study the role of aerosols on with respect to the 
Earth's climate. The mission was lost when the launch 
vehicle payload fairing failed to separate. The spacecraft, 
contained within the payload fairing, never made it to orbit 
and splashed down in the Pacific Ocean. [25] Glory was a 
Category 2 mission. 
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